Chomsky overcomplicates the crisis over US threats against Iran
Noam Chomsky has a piece in today’s Guardian1 in which he sets out what he believes would be needed to resolve what he calls “the Iranian nuclear crisis”.
If his piece were to be taken seriously, one would have to emerge from it with the depressing impression that, realistically, the crisis is utterly intractable. For Chomsky, a resolution of the crisis would require utopian global changes – implementation of a fissile material cutoff and steps by the world’s nuclear powers to live up to their side of the Non-proliferation Treaty. The latter is particularly absurd, as it seems most likely this treaty was always intended to operate as a “noble lie”, with none of the major nuclear powers ever having remotely intended to give up their own nuclear deterrent forces (as I have discussed elsewhere2). If resolution of the crisis really does depend upon these countries giving up their nuclear deterrent forces, then it is probably insoluble.
National defence is the most basic of all the justifications for the existence of national governments. Nuclear deterrence is demonstrably today the only ultimately effective means of national defence, and therefore the only provider of genuine national sovereignty3. Until that basic reality changes – perhaps through technological development, or the rise of a world government - a strong argument can be made that for any national government to abandon a nuclear deterrent force which has been bought at great cost would be a fundamental betrayal of its people. Perhaps Chomsky believes further cosmetic measures could revive the pretence that the nuclear powers’ side of the non-proliferation bargain is something other than a fig-leaf. Perhaps Britain and France could be persuaded to merge their (somewhat token) forces in an EU deterrent force. Maybe we can trumpet some supposed reductions in the number of times over the main Russian and American nuclear arsenals are capable of destroying the world. Ultimately, though, such measures are not going to persuade those nations which have built nuclear weapons out of a genuine need for defence against real threats, to abandon them4. Believing they might is pure utopian fantasy.
Fortunately, the crisis over Iranian nuclear development is much simpler to resolve than that. The resolution requires, however, clear perception of the false understanding which makes the problem seem intractable. Once it is recognised that the problem is not Iran’s activities, but rather the actions (or threatened actions) of the US and Israel, it becomes clear that the solution needed is not to coerce Iran into refraining from entirely legal and legitimate action, but to deter the US and Israel from illegal aggression.
It is (potentially, at least) much easier to deter wrongful aggression even by a superpower, than it is to bully a substantial nation into obedience to unjust restrictions. All that is required is to make it absolutely clear that the aggression will not be tolerated. Hopefully, the much-touted new Shanghai Cooperation Organisation might develop into a full-fledged defensive military alliance, which would effectively bring Iran under the Russian and Chinese nuclear umbrellas and supply Iran with much-needed conventional military muscle. Short of that, (and it seems unlikely that will develop quickly enough to defuse the present crisis) the key is probably for the EU nations to take direct and effective steps to protect Iran against Israeli or American military strikes.
The likely costs to the US of an attack upon Iran are heavy, particularly in the light of the ongoing disaster in Iraq, and all the signs are that the US regime is being forced to rethink its apparent earlier intention to attack Iran as soon as practicable after Iraq. Probably, the stiff resistance of the Iraqis has saved the world from the even greater catastrophe of an American attack on Iran. The decision probably hangs close to balance, and it seems likely that to ensure the outcome remains on the side of sanity, we only need European governments and media to stop pandering to the American lie that Iran is a “threat”. Such fear-mongering is what gives rise to atrocities such as the invasion of Iraq. European governments must understand that every time they pay lip-service to the American lie that Iran is a threat, they give more political cover to those who would like to see a military confrontation. Every attempt to “resolve” the crisis by putting diplomatic pressure on Iran helps to structure the popular western perception of the position as a false image of an “Iranian crisis”, rather than the true perception of the situation as a problem with the behaviour of the United States and Israel.
We should be putting pressure on the true source of the problems over Iranian development of civilian nuclear power – Israeli and American threats – rather than upon the nation which is merely exercising its sovereign right to pursue civilian nuclear power.
Chomsky sees this, and includes a reference to the need to "call off the very credible US and Israeli threats that virtually urge Iran to develop nuclear weapons as a deterrent”. However, his divergence into the realms of nuclear disarmament fantasy distract from this core issue and thereby help to spread the mistaken, but widespread, view of this as an “Iranian crisis”. Most ironic, given Chomsky’s personal background, is the way the title of his piece helps to promote that very fallacy. “Iranian nuclear crisis”, indeed!
Footnotes
1 “A negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis is within reach”, Guardian June 19th 2006
2 “Nonproliferation: from Noble Lie to pretext for war”
3 But doesn’t, say, Germany have genuine national sovereignty? Only on the sufferance of the nuclear powers. Were the Russian government, say, to demand any concession from the German government on pain of nuclear destruction, then only two things could allow the German government ultimately to avoid compliance or destruction of the nation – a “nuclear umbrella” provided by other nations (the US, France and the UK, for instance), or forbearance in the face of German stubborn-ness by nuclear-armed Russia. Non-nuclear nations cannot but lose unlimited wars with nuclear powers. Of course, this unpalatable reality is buried deep beneath layers of diplomacy, practicability and nuclear taboo, but it remains present whether we like it or not.
4 China needs nuclear weapons to deter nuclear-armed America – a proven aggressor nation which has made no secret of its hostility towards China – as well as, more distantly at the moment, India and Russia. Pakistan needs nuclear weapons to deter India, and vice versa. The US and Russia need them to deter each other. Israel needs them to deter Arab nations.
Indeed, of all the nations in the world Iran is probably the one with the greatest prima facie case for having a genuine and urgent need for a nuclear deterrent. It has seen two of its neighbours invaded and occupied by a hugely powerful and nuclear-armed aggressor nation (the US), whose government persistently makes public threats against it and openly engages in internal subversion with the goal of the overthrow of Iran’s present government and its replacement by a more amenable one. Strangely, as discussed in the essay referenced in note ii above, it seems as likely that Iran’s rulers may refrain from obtaining nuclear weapons out of real religious conviction, as not. In my own view, Iran’s rulers would be crazy (and irresponsible, in the exercise of their duty to protect their nation) not to seek a nuclear deterrent force in the present circumstances, but I suppose we are constantly being told, by Americans in particular, that the Iranian regime is made up of religious fanatics.
If his piece were to be taken seriously, one would have to emerge from it with the depressing impression that, realistically, the crisis is utterly intractable. For Chomsky, a resolution of the crisis would require utopian global changes – implementation of a fissile material cutoff and steps by the world’s nuclear powers to live up to their side of the Non-proliferation Treaty. The latter is particularly absurd, as it seems most likely this treaty was always intended to operate as a “noble lie”, with none of the major nuclear powers ever having remotely intended to give up their own nuclear deterrent forces (as I have discussed elsewhere2). If resolution of the crisis really does depend upon these countries giving up their nuclear deterrent forces, then it is probably insoluble.
National defence is the most basic of all the justifications for the existence of national governments. Nuclear deterrence is demonstrably today the only ultimately effective means of national defence, and therefore the only provider of genuine national sovereignty3. Until that basic reality changes – perhaps through technological development, or the rise of a world government - a strong argument can be made that for any national government to abandon a nuclear deterrent force which has been bought at great cost would be a fundamental betrayal of its people. Perhaps Chomsky believes further cosmetic measures could revive the pretence that the nuclear powers’ side of the non-proliferation bargain is something other than a fig-leaf. Perhaps Britain and France could be persuaded to merge their (somewhat token) forces in an EU deterrent force. Maybe we can trumpet some supposed reductions in the number of times over the main Russian and American nuclear arsenals are capable of destroying the world. Ultimately, though, such measures are not going to persuade those nations which have built nuclear weapons out of a genuine need for defence against real threats, to abandon them4. Believing they might is pure utopian fantasy.
Fortunately, the crisis over Iranian nuclear development is much simpler to resolve than that. The resolution requires, however, clear perception of the false understanding which makes the problem seem intractable. Once it is recognised that the problem is not Iran’s activities, but rather the actions (or threatened actions) of the US and Israel, it becomes clear that the solution needed is not to coerce Iran into refraining from entirely legal and legitimate action, but to deter the US and Israel from illegal aggression.
It is (potentially, at least) much easier to deter wrongful aggression even by a superpower, than it is to bully a substantial nation into obedience to unjust restrictions. All that is required is to make it absolutely clear that the aggression will not be tolerated. Hopefully, the much-touted new Shanghai Cooperation Organisation might develop into a full-fledged defensive military alliance, which would effectively bring Iran under the Russian and Chinese nuclear umbrellas and supply Iran with much-needed conventional military muscle. Short of that, (and it seems unlikely that will develop quickly enough to defuse the present crisis) the key is probably for the EU nations to take direct and effective steps to protect Iran against Israeli or American military strikes.
The likely costs to the US of an attack upon Iran are heavy, particularly in the light of the ongoing disaster in Iraq, and all the signs are that the US regime is being forced to rethink its apparent earlier intention to attack Iran as soon as practicable after Iraq. Probably, the stiff resistance of the Iraqis has saved the world from the even greater catastrophe of an American attack on Iran. The decision probably hangs close to balance, and it seems likely that to ensure the outcome remains on the side of sanity, we only need European governments and media to stop pandering to the American lie that Iran is a “threat”. Such fear-mongering is what gives rise to atrocities such as the invasion of Iraq. European governments must understand that every time they pay lip-service to the American lie that Iran is a threat, they give more political cover to those who would like to see a military confrontation. Every attempt to “resolve” the crisis by putting diplomatic pressure on Iran helps to structure the popular western perception of the position as a false image of an “Iranian crisis”, rather than the true perception of the situation as a problem with the behaviour of the United States and Israel.
We should be putting pressure on the true source of the problems over Iranian development of civilian nuclear power – Israeli and American threats – rather than upon the nation which is merely exercising its sovereign right to pursue civilian nuclear power.
Chomsky sees this, and includes a reference to the need to "call off the very credible US and Israeli threats that virtually urge Iran to develop nuclear weapons as a deterrent”. However, his divergence into the realms of nuclear disarmament fantasy distract from this core issue and thereby help to spread the mistaken, but widespread, view of this as an “Iranian crisis”. Most ironic, given Chomsky’s personal background, is the way the title of his piece helps to promote that very fallacy. “Iranian nuclear crisis”, indeed!
Footnotes
1 “A negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis is within reach”, Guardian June 19th 2006
2 “Nonproliferation: from Noble Lie to pretext for war”
3 But doesn’t, say, Germany have genuine national sovereignty? Only on the sufferance of the nuclear powers. Were the Russian government, say, to demand any concession from the German government on pain of nuclear destruction, then only two things could allow the German government ultimately to avoid compliance or destruction of the nation – a “nuclear umbrella” provided by other nations (the US, France and the UK, for instance), or forbearance in the face of German stubborn-ness by nuclear-armed Russia. Non-nuclear nations cannot but lose unlimited wars with nuclear powers. Of course, this unpalatable reality is buried deep beneath layers of diplomacy, practicability and nuclear taboo, but it remains present whether we like it or not.
4 China needs nuclear weapons to deter nuclear-armed America – a proven aggressor nation which has made no secret of its hostility towards China – as well as, more distantly at the moment, India and Russia. Pakistan needs nuclear weapons to deter India, and vice versa. The US and Russia need them to deter each other. Israel needs them to deter Arab nations.
Indeed, of all the nations in the world Iran is probably the one with the greatest prima facie case for having a genuine and urgent need for a nuclear deterrent. It has seen two of its neighbours invaded and occupied by a hugely powerful and nuclear-armed aggressor nation (the US), whose government persistently makes public threats against it and openly engages in internal subversion with the goal of the overthrow of Iran’s present government and its replacement by a more amenable one. Strangely, as discussed in the essay referenced in note ii above, it seems as likely that Iran’s rulers may refrain from obtaining nuclear weapons out of real religious conviction, as not. In my own view, Iran’s rulers would be crazy (and irresponsible, in the exercise of their duty to protect their nation) not to seek a nuclear deterrent force in the present circumstances, but I suppose we are constantly being told, by Americans in particular, that the Iranian regime is made up of religious fanatics.
posted by Randal at 3:32 PM
2 Comments:
Humans are way too analytical. war bad - peace good
If only things were really so simple....
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